Abstract-Applying deductive verification to formally prove that a program respects its formal specification is a very complex and time-consuming task due in particular to the lack of feedback in case of proof failures. Along with a non-compliance between the code and its specification (due to an error in at least one of them), possible reasons of a proof failure include a missing or too weak specification for a called function or a loop, and lack of time or simply incapacity of the prover to finish a particular proof. This work proposes a new methodology where test generation helps to identify the reason of a proof failure and to exhibit a counter-example clearly illustrating the issue. We describe how to transform an annotated C program into C code suitable for testing and illustrate the benefits of the method on comprehensive examples. The method has been implemented in STADY, a plugin of the software analysis platform FRAMA-C. Initial experiments show that detecting non-compliances and contract weaknesses allows to precisely diagnose most proof failures.
I. INTRODUCTION
Among formal verification techniques, deductive verification consists in establishing a rigorous mathematical proof that a given program meets its specification. When no confusion is possible, one also says that deductive verification consists in "proving a program". It requires that the program comes with a formal specification, usually given in special comments called annotations, including function contracts (with pre-and postconditions) and loop contracts (with loop variants and invariants). The weakest precondition calculus proposed by Dijkstra [1] reduces any deductive verification problem to establishing the validity of first-order formulas called verification conditions.
In modular deductive verification of a function f calling another function g, the roles of the pre-and postconditions of f and of the callee g are dual. The precondition of f is assumed and its postcondition must be proved, while at any call of g in f , the precondition of g must be proved before the call and its postcondition is assumed after the call. The situation for a function f with one call to g is presented in Fig. 1a . An arrow in this figure informally indicates that its initial point provides a hypothesis for a proof of its final point. For instance, the precondition Pre f of f and the postcondition Post g of g provide hypotheses for a proof of the postcondition Post f of f . The called function g is proved separately. The verification of the loop invariant I of a loop in f is illustrated by Fig. 1b: I must be proved to hold initially before the first loop iteration, and I ∧ ¬b is assumed after exiting the loop. To reflect the fact that some contracts become hypotheses during deductive verification of f we use the term subcontracts for f to designate contracts of called functions and loops in f .
Motivation.
One of the most important difficulties in deductive verification is the manual processing of proof failures by the verification engineer since proof failures may have several causes. Indeed, a failure to prove Pre g in Fig. 1a may be due to a noncompliance of the code to the specification: an error in the code code1, or a wrong specification Pre f or Pre g itself that may incorrectly formalize the requirements. The verification can also remain inconclusive because of a prover incapacity to finish a particular proof within an allocated time. In many cases, it is extremely difficult for the verification engineer to decide how to proceed: either suspect a non-compliance and look for an error in the code or check the specification, or suspect a prover incapacity, give up automatic proof and try to achieve an interactive proof with a proof assistant (like COQ [2] ).
A failure to prove the postcondition Post f (cf. Fig. 1a) is even more complex to analyze: along with a prover incapacity or a non-compliance due to errors in the pieces of code code1 and code2 or an incorrect specification Pre f or Post f , the failure can also result from a too weak postcondition Post g of g, that does not fully express the intended behavior of g. Notice that in this last case, the proof of g can still be successful. The current automated tools for program proving do not provide a precise indication on the reason of the proof failure. The most advanced tools (like DAFNY [3] ) produce a counter-example extracted from the underlying solver without saying directly if the verification engineer should look for a non-compliance, or strengthen subcontracts (and which one of them), or consider adding additional lemmas or using interactive proof. So the verification engineer must basically consider all possible reasons one after another, maybe also trying a very costly interactive proof. For a loop, the situation is similar and offers an additional challenge: to prove the invariant preservation, whose failure can be due to several reasons as well.
The motivation of this work is twofold. First, we want to provide the verification engineer with a more precise feedback indicating the reason of each proof failure. Second, we look for a counter-example that either confirms the non-compliance and demonstrates that the unproven predicate can indeed fail on a test datum, or confirms a subcontract weakness showing on a test datum which subcontract is insufficient.
Approach and goals.
We propose to use advanced test generation techniques in order to diagnose a proof failure and produce counter-examples. Their usage requires a translation of the annotated C program into an executable C code suitable for testing. Previous works addressed the generation of counterexamples only for non-compliance [4] and proposed a rulebased formalization of annotation translation in that case [5] . The cases of subcontract weakness remained undetected and indistinguishable from a prover incapacity. The overall goal of the present work is to provide a methodology for a more precise identification of proof failure reasons in all these cases, to implement it and to evaluate it in practice. The proposed method is composed of two steps. The first step looks for noncompliance. If no non-compliance is detected, the second step looks for a subcontract weakness. Another goal is to make this method automatic and suitable for a non-expert verification engineer. Following the modular verification approach, we assume that the called functions respect their contracts. To simplify the presentation, we also assume that the loops preserve their loop invariants, and focus on other proof failures occurring during modular verification of f . (The proposed detection techniques can be adapted to the verification of a loop contract.)
The contributions of this paper include:
• a classification of proof failures into three categories:
non-compliance, subcontract weakness and prover incapacity,
• a definition of counter-examples for the first two categories,
• a new program transformation technique for the diagnosis of a subcontract weakness by testing (in addition to the one previously proposed for noncompliance [5] ),
• a complete testing-based methodology for diagnosis of proof failures and generation of counter-examples, suggesting possible actions for each category, illustrated on several comprehensive examples,
• an implementation of the proposed solution in a tool called STADY, and
• experiments showing its capacity of diagnosis of proof failures. Paper outline. Sections II and III respectively present the tools used in this work and an illustrative example. Section IV defines the categories of proof failures and counter-examples, and presents program transformations for their identification. The complete methodology for the diagnosis of proof failures is presented in Section V. Our implementation and experiments are described in Sec. VI. Finally, Sections VII and VIII present some related works and a conclusion.
II. FRAMA-C TOOLSET This work is realized in the context of the FRAMA-C toolset. FRAMA-C [6] is a platform dedicated to analysis of C programs that includes various source code analyzers in separate plugins. The VALUE plugin performs value analysis by abstract interpretation. The WP plugin performs weakest precondition calculus for deductive verification of C programs. Several automatic SMT solvers can be used to prove the verification conditions generated by WP. In this work we use ALT-ERGO 0.99.1 and CVC3 2.4.1. FRAMA-C also includes plugins for control-flow and program dependency graph construction, program slicing, impact analysis, test generation, etc.
To express properties over C programs, FRAMA-C offers a behavioral specification language named ACSL [7] , [6] . ACSL annotations play a central role in communication between plugins: any analyzer can both add annotations to be verified by other ones and notify other plugins about its own analysis results by changing an annotation status. The status can indicate that the annotation is valid, valid under conditions, invalid or undetermined, and which analyzer established that result.
For combinations with dynamic analysis, FRAMA-C also supports E-ACSL [8] , [9] , a rich executable subset of ACSL suitable for runtime assertion checking. E-ACSL can express function contracts (pre/postconditions, guarded behaviors, completeness and disjointness of behaviors), assertions and loop contracts (variants and invariants). It supports quantifications over bounded intervals of integers, mathematical integers and memory-related constructs (e.g. on validity and initialization). It comes with an instrumentation-based translating plugin, called E-ACSL2C, that translates annotations into additional C code in order to evaluate annotations at runtime and report failures. Important differences between a translation for runtime assertion checking and a translation for test generation (e.g. to support unbounded integer arithmetics in E-ACSL and some specific annotations) [5] make E-ACSL2C inadequate for our work and create the need for a dedicated translation tool.
For test generation, this work relies on PATHCRAW-LER [10] , a Dynamic Symbolic Execution testing tool, combining concrete and symbolic execution. PATHCRAWLER is based on a specific constraint solver, COLIBRI, that implements advanced features such as floating-point and modular integer arithmetics support. PATHCRAWLER provides coverage strategies like k-path (feasible paths with at most k consecutive loop iterations) and all-paths (all feasible paths without any limitation on loop iterations). PATHCRAWLER is sound, meaning that each test case activates the test objective for which it was generated. This is verified by concrete execution. PATHCRAWLER is also complete in the following sense: when ensures is_rgf(a,n); 
III. ILLUSTRATING EXAMPLE
We illustrate the issues arising in deductive verification of programs and the solutions we propose on the example of C program of Fig. 2 . It comes from an ongoing work on formal specification and deductive verification [11] and implements an algorithm proposed in [12, page 235] . The example of Fig. 2 concerns the generation of Restricted Growth Functions (RGF), defined by the property expressed by the ACSL predicate is_rgf on lines 1-2 of Fig. 2 , where the RGF a is represented by the C array of its values. For convenience of the reader, some ACSL notations are replaced by mathematical symbols (e.g. keywords \exists, \forall and integer are respectively denoted by ∃, ∀ and Z). We focus now on the body of the function f in Fig. 2 The function g is used to fill the array with zeros to the right of index i. In addition to size and validity constraints (lines 7-8), its precondition requires that the elements of a up to index i form an RGF (lines 9-10). The function is allowed to modify the elements of a starting from the index i+1 (line 11) and generates an RGF (line 12). The loop invariants indicate the value interval of the loop variable k (line 15), and state that the property is_rgf is satisfied up to k (line 16). This invariant allows a deductive verification tool to deduce the postcondition. The annotation loop assigns (line 17) says that the only values the loop can change are k and the elements of a starting from the index i+1. The term n-k is a variant of the loop (line 18).
The ACSL lemma max_rgf on lines 4-5 states that if an array is an RGF, then each of its elements is at most equal to its index. This lemma is not proved as such by WP but can be used to ensure the absence of overflow at line 40.
The functions of Fig. 2 can be fully proved using WP. Suppose now this example contains one of the following four mistakes: the verification engineer either forgets the precondition on line 24, or writes the wrong assignment a[i]=a[i]+2; on line 40, or puts a too general clause loop assigns i,a[1..n-1]; on line 34, or forgets to provide the lemma on lines 4-5. In each of these four cases, the proof fails (for the precondition of g on line 41 and/or the assertion on line 39) for different reasons. In fact, only in the first two cases the code and specification are not compliant, while the third failure is due to a too weak subcontract, and the last one comes from a prover incapacity. To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing techniques allows to automatically distinguish the three reasons and suggest suitable actions. This work proposes a complete methodology to provide such assistance.
IV. CATEGORIES OF PROOF FAILURES AND
COUNTER-EXAMPLES Let P be a C program annotated in E-ACSL, and f the function under verification in P . Function f is assumed to be recursion-free. It may call other functions, let g denote any of them. A test datum V for f is a vector of values for all input variables of f . The program path activated by a test datum V , denoted π V , is the sequence of program statements executed by the program on the test datum V . We use the general term of a contract to designate the set of E-ACSL annotations describing a loop or a function. A function contract is composed of pre-and postconditions including E-ACSL clauses requires, assigns and ensures (cf. lines 22-30 in Fig. 2) . A loop contract is composed of loop invariant, loop variant and loop assigns clauses (cf. lines 15-18 in Fig. 2 ).
Obviously, an annotation cannot be proved for all inputs if there exist inputs for which the property does not hold. The notion of counter-example depends on the way annotations are evaluated. The diagnosis of proof failures based on the prover's counter-examples can be imprecise since from the prover's point of view, the code of callees and loops in f is replaced by the corresponding subcontracts. To make this diagnosis more precise, we propose to take into account their code as well as their contracts, and to treat both by testing. In this section, we define three kinds of proof failure reasons, two kinds of counter-examples and associated detection techniques. Sec. IV-A defines a non-compliance and briefly recalls the detection technique previously published in [5] . Sec. IV-B is part of the original contribution of this paper, which introduces too new categories of proof failures and a new translation for test generation.
A. Non-Compliance
A previous work [5] formally described how to transform a C program P annotated in E-ACSL into an instrumented program, denoted P NC in this paper, on which we can apply test generation to produce test data violating some annotations at runtime.
1 P NC checks all annotations of P in the corresponding program locations and reports any failure. For instance, the postcondition Post f of f is evaluated by the following code inserted at the end of the function f in P NC :
For an E-ACSL predicate P, we denote by Spec2Code(P, b) the generated C code evaluating the predicate P and assigning its validity status to the Boolean variable b (see [5] for details). The function call fassert(b) is expanded into a conditional statement if(b) that reports the failure and exits whenever b is false. Similarly, preconditions and postconditions of a callee g are evaluated respectively before and after executing the function g. A loop invariant is checked before the loop (for being initially true) and after each loop iteration (for being preserved by the previous loop iteration). An assertion is checked at its location. To generate only test data that respect the precondition Pre f of f , it is checked in the beginning of f similarly to ( †) except that fassert is replaced by fassume to assume the given condition.
Definition 1 (Non-compliance):
We say that there is a noncompliance between code and specification in P if there exists a test datum V for f respecting its precondition, such that P NC reports an annotation failure on V . In this case, we say that V is a non-compliance counter-example (NCCE).
Test generation on the translated program P NC can be used to generate NCCEs (cf. [5] ). We call this technique Non-Compliance Detection (NCD). In this work we use the PATHCRAWLER test generator that will try to cover all program paths. Since the translation step has added a branch for the (An optimization in PATHCRAWLER avoids covering the same fassert failure several times.) The NCD step may have three outcomes. It returns (nc, V , a) if an NCCE V has been found indicating the failing annotation a and recording the program path π V activated by V on P NC . Second, if it has managed to perform a complete exploration of all program paths without finding an NCCE, it returns no (cf. the discussion of completeness in the end of Sec. II). Otherwise, if only a partial exploration of program paths has been performed (due to a timeout, partial coverage criterion or any other limitation), it returns ? (unknown).
B. Subcontract Weakness and Prover Incapacity
To introduce the new categories of proof failures, we follow the modular verification approach and need a few definitions. A non-imbricated loop (resp. function, assertion) in f is a loop (resp. function called, assertion) in f outside any loop in f . A subcontract for f is the contract of some non-imbricated loop or function in f . A non-imbricated annotation in f is either a non-imbricated assertion or an annotation in a subcontract for f . For instance, the function f of Fig. 2 has two subcontracts: the contract of the called function g and the contract of the loop on lines 33-37. The contract of the loop in g on lines 15-19 is not a subcontract for f , but is a subcontract for g.
We focus on non-imbricated annotations in f and assume that all subcontracts for f are respected: the called functions in f respect their contracts, and the loops in f preserve their loop invariants and respect all imbricated annotations. Let c f denote the contract of f , C the set of non-imbricated subcontracts for f , and A the set of all non-imbricated annotations in f and the annotations of c f . In other words, A contains the annotations included in the contracts C ∪ {c f } as well as non-imbricated assertions in f . We also assume that any subcontract of f contains a (loop) assigns clause. This assumption is not restrictive since such a clause is anyway necessary for the proof of any nontrivial code.
Subcontract weakness. To apply testing for the contracts of called functions and loops in C instead of their code, we use a program transformation of P producing a new program P GSW . The code of all non-imbricated function calls and loops in f is replaced by a new one as follows.
For the contract c ∈ C of a called function g in f , the program transformation (illustrated by Fig. 3) generates a new function g_swd with the same signature whose code simulates any possible behavior respecting the postcondition in c, and replaces all calls to g by a call to g_swd. First, g_swd allows Fig.3(b) ). It can be realized by assigning a non-deterministic value of the appropriate type using a dedicated function, denoted here by Nondet() (or simply by adding an array of fresh input variables and reading a different value for each use and each function invocation). If the return type of g is not void, another nondeterministic value is read for the returned value ret (line 3 in Fig.3(b) ). Finally, the validity of the postcondition is evaluated (taking into account these new non-deterministic values) and assumed in order to consider only executions that respect the postcondition, and the function returns (lines 4-5 in Fig.3(b) ).
Similarly, for the contract c ∈ C of a loop in f , the program transformation replaces the code of the loop by another code that simulates any possible behavior respecting c, that is, ensuring the "loop postcondition" I ∧ ¬b after the loop as shown in Fig. 4 . In addition, the transformation treats in the same way as in P NC all other annotations in A: preconditions of called functions, initial loop invariant verifications and the pre-and postcondition of f (they are not shown in Fig. 3(b) and 4(b)).
Definition 2 (Global subcontract weakness):
We say that P has a global subcontract weakness for f if there exists a test datum V for f respecting its precondition, such that P NC does not report any annotation failure on V , while P GSW reports an annotation failure on V . In this case, we say that V is a global subcontract weakness counter-example (GSWCE) for the set of subcontracts C.
Notice that we do not consider the same counter-example as an NCCE and an SWCE. Indeed, even if some counterexamples may illustrate both a subcontract weakness and a non-compliance, we consider that non-compliances usually come from a direct conflict between the code and the specification and should be addressed first, while contract weaknesses are often more subtle and will be easier to address when noncompliances are eliminated.
Again, test generation can be applied on P GSW to generate GSWCE candidates. When it finds a test datum V such that P GSW fails on V , we use runtime assertion checking: if P NC fails on V , then V is classified as an NCCE, otherwise V is a GSWCE. We call this technique Global Subcontract Weakness Detection for the set of all subcontracts, denoted GSWD. The GSWD step may have four outcomes. It returns (nc, V , a) if an NCCE V has been found for the failing annotation a, and (sw, V , a, C) if V has been finally classified as an SWCE indicating the failing annotation a and the set of subcontracts C. The program path π V activated by V and leading to the failure (on P NC or P GSW ) is recorded as well. If the GSWD has managed to perform a complete exploration of all program paths without finding an GSWCE, it returns no. Otherwise, if only a partial exploration of program paths has been performed it returns ? (unknown).
A GSWCE indicates a global subcontract weakness but does not explicitly identify which single subcontract c ∈ C is too weak. To do that, we propose another program transformation of P into an instrumented program P SSW c . It is realized by replacing only one non-imbricated function call or loop by the code respecting the postcondition of corresponding subcontract c (as indicated in Fig. 3 and 4) and transforming other annotations in A as in P NC .
Definition 3 (Single subcontract weakness):
Let c be a subcontract for f . We say that c is a too weak subcontract (or has a single subcontract weakness) for f if there exists a test datum V for f respecting its precondition, such that P NC does not report any annotation failure on V , while P SSW c reports an annotation failure on V . In this case, we say that V is a single subcontract weakness counter-example (SSWCE) for the subcontract c in f .
For any subcontract c ∈ C, test generation can be separately applied on P SSW c to generate SSWCE candidates. If such a test datum V is generated, it is checked on P NC to classify it as an NCCE or an SSWCE. We call this technique, applied for all subcontracts one after another until a first counterexample V is found, Single Contract Weakness Detection, denoted SSWD. The SSWD step may have three outcomes. It returns (nc, V , a) if an NCCE V has been found for a failing annotation a, and (sw, V , a, {c}) if V has been finally classified as an SSWCE indicating the failing annotation a and the single too weak subcontract c. The program path π V activated by V and leading to the failure (on P NC or P SSW c ) is recorded as well. Otherwise, it returns ? (unknown), since even after an exhaustive path testing the absence of SSWCE for any individual subcontract c does not imply the absence of Indeed, sometimes SSWD cannot exhibit a subcontract weakness for a single subcontract while there is a global subcontract weakness for all of them at once. For example in Fig. 5a , if we apply SSWD to any of the subcontracts, we always have x ≥ \old(x)+5 at the end of f (we add 1 to x by executing the translated subcontract, and add 2 twice by executing the other two functions' code), so the postcondition of f holds and no weakness is detected. If we run GSWD to consider all subcontracts at once, we only get x≥\old(x)+3 after executing the three subcontracts, and can exhibit a counterexample.
On the other hand, running GSWD produces a GSWCE that does not indicate which one of the subcontracts is too weak, while SSWD can sometimes be more precise. For  Fig. 5b , since the three callees are replaced by their subcontracts for GSWD, it is impossible to find out which one is too weak. Counter-examples generated by a prover suffer from the same precision issue: taking into account all subcontracts instead of the corresponding code prevents from a precise identification of a single too week subcontract. In this example we can be more precise with SSWD, since only the replacement of the subcontract of g3 also leads to an SSWCE: we can have x ≥\old(x)+3 by executing g1, g2 and the subcontract of g3, exhibiting the contract weakness of g3. Thus, the proposed SSWD technique can provide the verification engineer with a more precise diagnostic than counter-examples extracted from a prover.
We define a combined subcontract weakness detection technique, denoted SWD, applying first SSWD followed by GSWD until the first SWCE is found. SWD may have the same four outcomes as SSWD. It allows us to be both precise (and indicate when possible a single subcontract being too weak), and complete (capable to find GSWCEs even when there are no single subcontract weaknesses).
Prover incapacity. When neither a non-compliance nor a global subcontract weakness exist, we cannot demonstrate that it is impossible to prove the property.
Definition 4 (Prover incapacity):
We say that a proof failure in P is due to a prover incapacity if for any test datum V for f respecting its precondition, neither P N C nor P GSW report any annotation failure on V . In other words, there is no NCCE and no GSWCE for P .
V. DIAGNOSIS OF PROOF FAILURES USING STRUCTURAL TESTING In this section, we present an overview of our method for diagnosis of proof failures using the detection techniques of Sec. IV, and illustrate it on several examples. We also provide a comprehensive list of suggestions of actions for each category of proof failures.
The method. The proposed method is illustrated by Fig. 6 . Suppose that the proof of the annotated program P fails for some non-imbricated annotation a ∈ A. The first step tries to find a non-compliance using NCD. If such a non-compliance is found, it generates an NCCE (marked by 1 in Fig. 6 ) and classifies the proof failure as a non-compliance. If the first step cannot generate a counter-example, the SWD step combines SSWD and GSWD and tries to generate single SWCEs, then global SWCEs, until the first counter-example is generated and classified (either as an NCCE 1 or an SWCE 2 ). If no counter-example has been found, the last step checks the outcomes. If both NCD and SWD have returned no, that is, both NCD and GSWD have performed a complete path exploration without finding a counter-example, the proof failure is classified as a prover incapacity 3 (cf. Def. 4). Otherwise, it remains unclassified 4 . Fig. 7 associates a variant of the illustrating example to each case. For each case, we detail the lines we modified in the program of Fig. 2 to obtain a new program, the intermediate results of deductive verification, NCD and SWD and the final verdict (including the generated counter-example if any).
The proof failure category and the counter-example V , along with the recorded path π V , the reported failing annotation a and set of too weak subcontracts S, can be extremely helpful for the verification engineer. Suppose we try to prove in WP a modified version of the function f of Fig. 2 where the precondition at line 24 is missing. The proof of the precondition of g on line 10 for the call on line 41 fails without indicating a precise reason. The NCD step of STADY generates an NCCE (case 1 , #1 in Fig. 7 ) where is_rgf(a,n) is clearly false due to a[0] being non-zero, and indicates the failing annotation (coming from line 10). That helps the verification engineer to understand and fix the issue.
Let us suppose now that the clause on line 34 has been erroneously written as follows: loop assigns i, a[1..n-1];. The loop on lines 36-37 still preserves its invariant. The NCD step does not find any NCCE, as this modification did not introduce any non-compliance between the code and its specification. Thanks to the replacement shown in Fig. 4 , SSWD for the contract of this loop will detect a single subcontract weakness for the loop contract (case 2 , #2 in Fig. 7) , and report a fail to establish the precondition of g (on line 10) for the call on line 41. With the indication of the single subcontract weakness for the loop, the verification engineer will try to strengthen the loop contract and find the issue.
Suppose now we want to prove the absence of overflow at line 40 of Fig. 2 , but the lemma on lines 4-5 (that allows the prover to deduce this property) is missing. The proof fails without giving a precise reason since the prover does not perform the induction needed to deduce the right bounds on a[i]. Neither NCD nor SWD can produce a counter-example, and as the initial program has too many paths, their outcomes are ? (unknown) (case 4 , #4 in Fig. 7 ). For such situations, STADY offers the possibility to reduce the input domain. The verification engineer can add the ACSL clause typically n<5; to reduce the array size for testing (this clause is ignored by the proof). Running STADY now allows the tool to complete the exploration of all program paths (for n<5) both for NCD and SWD without finding a counter-example. STADY classifies the proof failure for the program with the reduced domain as a prover incapacity (case 3 , #3 in Fig. 7) . That gives the verification engineer more confidence that the proof failure has the same reason on the initial program for bigger sizes n.
The verification engineer prefers to try interactive proof or adding additional lemmas or assertions, and does not waste time looking for a bug or a too week subcontract.
Suggestions of actions.
From the possible outcomes of the method illustrated in Fig. 6 we are able to suggest to the verification engineer the most suitable actions (displayed in Fig. 8 ) to help her with the verification task. A noncompliance of the code w.r.t. annotation a means that there is an inconsistency between the precondition, the annotation a and the code of the path π V leading to a. Thanks to the counter-example, the values of variables at different program points along π V can be either traced or explored in a debugger [13] . In FRAMA-C, the execution on V can be conveniently explored using VALUE or PATHCRAWLER. This helps the verification engineer to understand the issue. Indeed, if an NCCE is generated, there is no need to try automatic proof or look for a too weak subcontract -it will not help. The reason of the proof failure is necessarily related to a non-compliance between the code and annotations traversed by the path π V .
A weakness of a set of subcontracts S means that at least one of the contracts of C has to be strengthened. By Definitions 2 and 3, the non-compliance is excluded here, that is, the execution of P NC on V respects the annotation a, thus the suggested action is to strengthen the subcontract(s). In the case of single subcontract weakness, S is a singleton so the suggestion is very precise and helpful to the user. Again, trying interactive proof or additional assertions or lemmas will be useless here since the property can obviously not be proved because of the counter-example. For a prover incapacity, the verification engineer may write lemmas or assertions, add hypotheses that may help the theorem prover to succeed or try another theorem prover. She also may want to use a proof assistant like COQ, so that she does not suffer from the limitations of the theorem provers, but this task can be more complex and time-consuming. Finally, when the verdict is unknown, test generation for NCD and/or SWD times out, so the verification engineer may strengthen the precondition for testing to reduce the input domain, or extend the timeout to give STADY more time to conclude.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTS
Implementation. The proposed method for diagnosis of proof failures has been implemented as a FRAMA-C plugin, named STADY. It relies on other plugins: WP [6] for deductive verification and PATHCRAWLER [10] for structural test generation. STADY currently supports a significant subset of the E-ACSL specification language, including requires, ensures, behavior, assumes, loop invariant, loop variant and assert clauses. Quantified predicates \exists and \forall and builtin terms as \sum or \numof are translated as loops. Logic functions and named predicates are treated by inlining. The \old constructs are treated by saving the initial values of formal parameters and global variables at the beginning of the function. Validity checks of pointers are partially supported due to the current limitation of the underlying test generator: we can only check the validity of input pointers and global arrays. The assigns clauses are only taken into consideration during the SWD phase: we do not aim to find what is missing in the assigns clause (NCD) because provers usually give sufficiently good feedback about it, but we want to find what is unnecessary and could be removed from an assigns clause (SWD). Inductive predicates, recursive functions and floatingpoint numbers are currently not supported and are part of our future work.
The research questions we address in our experiments are the following. RQ1 Is STADY able to precisely diagnose most proof failures in C programs?
RQ2
What are the benefits of the SWD extension (in particular, with respect to NCD)?
RQ3 Is STADY able to generate NCCEs or SWCEs even with a partial testing coverage?
RQ4 Is STADY's execution time comparable to the time of an automatic proof? Experimental protocol. The evaluation used 20 annotated programs from [14] , whose size varies from 35 to 100 lines of annotated C code. These programs manipulate arrays, they are fully specified in ACSL and their specification expresses nontrivial properties of C arrays. To evaluate the method presented in Sec. V and its implementation, we apply STADY on systematically generated altered versions (or mutants) of correct C programs. Each mutant program is obtained by performing a single modification (or mutation) on the initial program. The mutations include: a binary operator modification in the code Case Verdict Suggestions 1
Non-compliance w.r.t. the annotation a:
check the violated annotation a or the code leading to a in the path π V , or strengthen the precondition of the function under verification 2
Weakness of subcontracts in S w.r.t. the annotation a: (sw, V , a, S) strengthen one or several subcontracts in S to exclude the subcontract weakness 3 Prover incapacity add lemmas or assertions to help the theorem prover, or use another prover, or an interactive proof assistant 4 Unknown strengthen the typically clause or coverage criterion (e.g. k-path), or increase the timeout limit for testing or in the specification, a condition negation in the code, a relation modification in the specification, a predicate negation in the specification, a partial loop invariant or postcondition deletion in the specification. In this study, we do not mutate the precondition of the function under verification, and restrict possible mutations on binary operators to avoid creating absurd expressions, in particular for pointer arithmetics.
The first step tries to prove each mutant using WP. The proved mutants respect the specification and are classified as correct. Second, we apply the NCD method on the remaining mutants. It classifies proof failures for some mutants as noncompliances, indicates the failing annotation and an NCCE. The third step applies the SWD method on remaining mutants, classifies some of them as subcontract weaknesses, indicates the weak subcontract and a SWCE. If no counter-example has been found by the SWD, the mutant remains unclassified. The results are displayed in Fig. 9 . The columns present the number of generated mutants, and the results of each of the three steps: the number (#) and ratio (%) of classified mutants, maximal and average execution time (put on two lines) of the step over classified mutants (t ✓ or t ✗ ) and over nonclassified mutants (t ? ) at this step. The ratios are computed with respect to unclassified mutants after the previous step. The NCD+SWD columns sum up selected results after both NCD and SWD steps: the average and maximal time (t) are shown globally over all mutants. The time is computed until the proof is finished or until the first counter-example is generated. The final number of remaining unclassified mutants (#?) is given in the last column.
Experimental results. For the 20 considered programs, 928 mutants have been generated. 80 of them have been proved by WP. Among the 848 unproven mutants, NCD has detected a non-compliance induced by the mutation in 776 mutants (91.5%), leaving 72 unclassified. Among them, SWD has been able to exhibit a counter-example (either a NCCE or a SWCE) for 48 of them (66.7%), finally leaving 24 programs unclassified. They can be either equivalent mutants that were not proved by WP due to a prover incapacity, or mutants coming from a mutation in an unsupported annotation being undetectable by the current version, or incorrect mutants for which testing was incomplete due to a timeout. Regarding RQ1, STADY has found a precise reason of the proof failures and produced a counter-example in 824 of the 848 unproven mutants, i.e. classifying 97.2%. Exploring the benefits of detecting a prover incapacity may often require to manually reduce the input domain, to try additional lemmas or interactive proof, so it was not sufficiently investigated in this study (and would probably require another, non mutational approach).
Regarding RQ2, NCD alone diagnosed 776 of 848 unproven mutants (91.5%). SWD diagnosed 48 of the 72 remaining mutants (66.7%) bringing a significant complementary contribution to a better understanding of reasons of many proof failures.
In our experiments, each prover can try to prove each verification condition during at most 40 seconds. We also set a timeout for any test generation session to 5 seconds, i.e. one session for the NCD step, and several sessions for SWD steps. We also limit the depth of explored program paths with the k-path criterion (cf. Sec. II) setting k = 4. Both the session timeout and the k-path heavily limit the testing coverage but STADY still detects 97.2% of faults in the generated programs. That addresses RQ3 and demonstrates that the proposed method can efficiently classify proof failures and generate counter-examples even with a partial testing coverage and can therefore be used for programs where the total number of paths cannot be limited (e.g. by the typically clause).
Concerning RQ4, on the considered programs WP needs on average 2.6 sec. per mutant (at most 4.4 sec.) to prove a program, and spends 13.0 sec. on average (at most 61.3 sec.) when the proof fails. The total execution time of STADY is comparable: it needs on average 2.7 sec. per unproven mutant (at most 19.9 sec.).
Summary.
The experiments show that the proposed method can automatically classify a significant number of proof failures within an analysis time comparable to the time of an automatic proof and for programs for which only a partial testing coverage is possible. The SWD technique offers an efficient complement to NCD for a more complete and more precise diagnosis of proof failures.
Threats to validity.
As it is often the case in software verification studies, one major threat is related to the representativeness of results, i.e. their external validity. In our case, due to the nature of the problem, we are restricted to realistic annotated programs that cannot be generated automatically or extracted from existing databases of unspecified code. Therefore, to reduce this threat, we used programs from an independent benchmark [14] created in order to illustrate on different examples the usage of the ACSL specification language for deductive verification with FRAMA-C. Scalability of the results is another threat since we do not demonstrate their validity for functions of larger programs. Because of the modular reasoning of deductive verification, it can be argued that the proposed technique should only be applied on a unit level, separately for each function, since the verification engineer proves a program in this way. Indeed, in the current practice of deductive verification, it does not make sense to analyze proof failures for the whole module or application at the same time.
The main scalability concern is thus related to the usage of structural test generation that can often time out without achieving a full coverage. To address this issue, we have specifically investigated the impact of a partial test coverage on the effectiveness of the method (cf. RQ3 above) and proposed a convenient way to reduce the input domain (using typically clause, an extension of ACSL).
Other threats can be due to the used measurements, i.e. construct validity. To reduce this threat, we used a careful measurement of results (including analysis time for each step and each mutant, their mean and maximal values, separately computed for classified and unclassified proof failures). One concern is producing realistic situations in which the verification engineer can need help in the analysis of proof failures. While the first users of STADY have appreciated its feedback, we have not yet had the opportunity to organize a fair evaluation with a representative group of users. Thus we have performed an extended set of experiments using simulation of errors by mutations as an alternative in the meanwhile. We have chosen a large subset of mutation operators (mutation in the code, mutation in an annotation, deletion of an annotation) that model frequent problematic situations (incorrect code or annotations, incomplete specification) leading to proof failures. This approach looks suitable for non-compliance and subcontract weaknesses, and certainly less suitable for the more subtle prover incapacity cases. The results should be later confirmed by a representative user study.
VII. RELATED WORK Understanding proof failures. A two-step verification in [15] compares the proof failures of an Eiffel program with those of its variant where called functions are inlined and loops are unrolled. It reports code and contract revision suggestions from this comparison. Inlining and unrolling are respectively limited to a given number of nested calls and explicit iterations. If that number is too small the semantics is lost and a warning of unsoundness is also reported to the user.
Proof tree analysis. More precision can be statically obtained by analyzing the unclosed branches of a proof tree. The work [16] is performed in the context of KEY and its verification calculus that applies deduction rules to a dynamic formula mixing a program and its specification. It proposes falsifiability preservation checking that helps to distinguish whether the branch failure comes from a programming error or from a contract weakness. However this technique can detect bugs only if contracts are strong enough. Moreover it is automatic only if a prover (typically, an SMT solver) can decide the non-satisfiability of the first-order formula expressing the falsifiability preservation condition. [17] exploits the proof trees generated during a proof attempt by KEY. The relevance of generated tests depends on the quality of the specification written by the user, and it does not allow to distinguish noncompliances from specification weaknesses.
Combination of static and dynamic analysis. Static and dynamic analysis work better when used together, as in the method SYNERGY [18] , its interprocedural and compositional extension in SMASH [19] , the method SANTE [20] and the present method. Static analysis maintains an overapproximation that aims at verifying the correctness of the system, while dynamic analysis maintains an under-approximation trying to detect an error. Both abstractions help each other in a way similar to the counter-example guided abstraction refinement method (CEGAR) [21] .
Counter-examples for non-inductive invariants.
Counter-examples can be generated to show that invariants proposed for transition systems are too strong or too weak [22] . Differences with our work are the focus on invariants, the formalism of transition systems, and the use of random testing (with QUICKCHECK).
Other verification feedbacks. Our goal was to find input data to illustrate proof failures. A complementary work [13] proposed to extend a runtime assertion checker to use it as a debugger to help the user understand complex proof failure counter-examples. The DAFNY development environment [3] provides verification feedback to the user during the programming phase. It integrates the BOOGIE Verification Debugger [23] that helps the understanding of verification tools like BOOGIE. Currently, DAFNY only uses counter-examples provided by the solver, and does not produce as much information when verification times out as it does when verification fails.
Checking prover assumptions. Axioms are logic properties used as hypotheses by provers and thus usually not checked. Model-based testing applied to a computational model of an axiom permits to detect errors in axioms and thus to maintain the soundness of the axiomatization [24] . This work is complementary to ours because it tackles the case of deductive verification trivially succeeding due to an invalid axiomatization, whereas we tackle the case of inconclusive deductive verification. [25] proposed to complete the results of static checkers with dynamic symbolic execution using PEX. The explicit assumptions used by the verifier (absence of overflows, non-aliasing, etc.) create new branches in the program's control flow graph which PEX tries to explore. This approach permits to detect errors out of the scope of the considered static checkers, but does not provide counterexamples in case of a specification weakness.
The present work continues the previous efforts to facilitate deductive verification by generating counter-examples. We propose an original detection technique of three categories of proof failure that gives a more precise diagnostic than in the previous work using testing. Thanks to the separate detection of non-compliances and single subcontract weaknesses, the generated counter-examples can better identify the reasons of proof failures than those extracted from a solver. To the best of our knowledge, such a complete testing-based methodology proposed in this paper, automatically providing to the verification engineer a precise feedback on proof failures was not studied, implemented and evaluated before.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We proposed a new approach to improve the user feedback in case of a proof failure. Our method relies on test generation and helps to decide whether the proof has failed or timed out due to a non-compliance between the code and the specification, a subcontract weakness, or a prover weakness. This approach is based on a spec-to-code program transformation that allows to use a test generator taking a C program as input. The transformation for SWD is an original contribution of this paper. Our experiments show that our implementation -as a FRAMA-C plugin, STADY-was able to diagnose over 97% of the programs (generated by introducing a mutation in a verified program).
One benefit of the proposed approach is the capacity to provide the verification engineer with a precise reason of a proof failure that helps to choose the right way to proceed and facilitates the processing of proof failures. Counter-examples illustrate the issue on concrete values and help to find out more easily why the proof fails. The method is completely automatic, relies on the existing specification and does not require any additional manual specification or instrumentation task. As a consequence, this method can be adopted by less experienced verification engineers and software developers.
One requirement of the complete method coming from test generation is to have the C code of called functions, while the GSWD technique remains applicable even without source code. Another limitation is related to a potentially very big number of program path, that cannot be explored. Initial experiments show that proof failures can be classified in practice even after test generation with a partial test coverage, within a testing time comparable to the time of the proof.
We are convinced that the proposed methodology facilitates the verification task by lowering the level of expertise required to conduct a deductive program proof, removing one of the major obstacles for a wider use of deductive verification in industry. Future work includes further evaluation of the proposed methodology, a study of optimized combinations of NCD and SWD for subsets of annotations and subcontracts, experiments on a larger class of programs and a better support of E-ACSL constructs in our implementation (inductive predicates, validity of non-input pointers). Fig. 10 illustrates the translation of an annotated program P into another C program, P NC , that is used to generate counterexamples during non-compliance detection (NCD).
